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SIGNIVICANT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISiONS OV
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DURING
THE OCTOBER 1962-1963 TERM
Benjamin N. Schoenfeld*
INTRODUCTION
During the last term of Court, the Supreme Court handed down important decisions in several aspects of the administrative process.
This article will review the developments in this area of public law
and examine the voting behaviour of the Justices. Of a total number
of one hundred and twenty nine written opinions, sixty three dealt
with constitutionally significant matters while thirty dealt with important issues in the area of administrative law. Of thirty such
cases, the Court rendered twenty seven opinions and three per curiam
opinions. In twelve cases, significant problems involving administrative jurisdiction were presented. The Court was primarily concerned
with legal aspects of the evidence considered by the administrative
bodies in decision-making in six opinions, while an equal number were
concerned with administrative determinations of law. The Court, in
addition, considered problems of standing to sue, questions of fact,
and tort liability.
STANDING TO SUE
In two brief per curiam opinions, the Court disposed of challenges
to the plaintiff's standing to sue or maintain legal action. In National
Motor Freight Traffic Association v. U. S., 1 although it affirmed the
District Court dismissal of the appellant's action to set aside an ICC
order, the Court in a per curiam opinion reversed the ruling on the
appellant's standing to sue, holding the appellants, associations of
motor carriers authorized under 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1948), who per* A.B, M-A, University of California, Los Angeles; Ph.D. University of
Pennsylvania; LL.B. Temple University; Associate Professor of Political Science,
Temple University.
1.

372 U.S. 248, (1963).
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formed significant functions in the administration of the Interstate
Commerce Act and represented member carriers in Commission proceedings, were proper representatives of the interests of their members and had standing to challenge the validity of the administrative
orders. 2 Mr. Justice Harlan was of the opinion that the question of
standing should not have been decided without a full consideration.
In a second case, Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan,3 in reviewing the
practices of the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in
Youth, a state agency which had notified an exclusive wholesale distributor of the obscenity of certain books which were subsequently
withdrawn by the publishers rather than face the possibility of court
action, the Court held that the appellant publishers had standing to
contest the legality of the Commission's actions despite the fact
that the Commission's notices were circulated only to distributors
and not to them. Mr. Justice Brennan, delivering the Court's opinion on behalf of seven Justices, found the standing to sue was based
upon the claim of the Commission's unlawful interference into an
advantageous business relationship with the wholesaler. In separate
opinions, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark concurred.
Although Mr. Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's opinion invalidating the statute, he nevertheless upheld the legal standing of
the publisher to contest the legality of the Commission's actions.
TORT LIABILITY
The Court had only a single occasion to further explore the area of
tort liability of federal officials acting within the scope of their authority. In Dugan v. Rank and Delano-EarlimartIrrigation District
v. Rank,3 A where the claimants of water rights along the San Joaquin
River below Friant Dam, California, and part of the Federal Government's Central Valley Reclamation Project sued to enjoin officials of
the Bureau of Reclamation from storing and diverting the river
waters or demanded a physical solution of water rights, the District
Court held the United States was a proper party to be sued and that
the impounding of the waters was an unauthorized and unlawful act
of the federal officials. 4 On certiorari, the Court unanimously held
the statute was inapplicable to a dispute over water rights. Mr.
Justice Clark, delivering the Court's opinion, found the Court of
2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1946) ; Federal Communications Com. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, (1940), NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, (1958).
3.

372 U.S. 58, (1963).

3A. 372 U.S. 609, (1963).
4. Statute construed 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1952).
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Appeals incorrectly applied Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp.,5 in that the injunction was against a sovereign who was spending sums from the public treasury and in the public domain, interfering with public administration. 6 The Court found that the actions
of the federal officials did not fall within the recognized exceptions to
the general rule of immunity of public officials from liability since
their action was not beyond statutory authority nor was their action
within the scope of their authority but based upon a constitutionally
void statute.7 The wrongful taking exercised by the officers occurred
in the exercising of powers delegated by the sovereign entity and was
more than a trespass upon the property of the claimants. The Chief
Justice took no part in these cases.
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
The great bulk of the cases decided by the Court have dealt with
various aspects of administrative jurisdiction. Although the Court
has disposed of issues challenging the fundamental jurisdiction of
the administrative body to regulate areas of behaviour, the predominant issue of jurisdiction has centered over the relationship of courts
and administrative bodies with reference to the sequence of adjudication where administrative determinations are challenged. This is
reflected in the number of opinions disposing of primary jurisdiction
issues.
JURISDICTION
A challenge to the jurisdiction of the NLRB was raised in McCulloch
v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,8 Mr. Justice Clark
delivering the Court's opinion (8-0), held that the National Labor
Relations Board was without jurisdiction under Section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 541,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947) to order an election for certifying a collective
bargaining agent as the representative of unlicensed seamen employed by a vessel flying a Honduran flag and owned by a Honduran
corporation whose stock was entirely held by Americans where the
crew was represented by a Honduran labor union under a Honduran
statute requiring that the union be composed of at least 90 per cent
of Honduran citizens, and where the vessel entered American waters
during its ports of call. The Court rejected the Board's contention
5.

337 U.S. 682 (1949).

6.

Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).

7. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179
U.S. 141 (1900); Santa Fe P.R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197 (1922).
8.

372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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that the vessel was engaged in 'commerce' within the meaning of
Section 2(6) of the Act 9 and that its maritime operations "affected
commerce" within the orbit of Section 2(7),10 thus meeting the jurisdictional requirement of Section 9(c) (1).11 Mr. Justice Clark
found that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative
history justified the expansion of the interpretation to include the
extension of American jurisdiction to the internal management and
affairs of vessels flying a Honduran flag since it conflicted with the
well established rule of international law that the law of the flag
state ordinarily governed the internal affairs of the ship.1 2 Moreover, the exercise of local sovereignty over an aspect of international
relations required greater clarity of congressional intent than a reading of the statute disclosed. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the
Court's opinion which was based upon its views in Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo,1 3 from which he dissented. Mr. Justice Goldberg
did not participate in the case.
Inores Steamship Company v. International Maritime Workers
Union and Wall, was similarly decided.14
EXCLUSIVENESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
In three opinions in the Arrow Transportation,Borden, and Perko
cases the Court expanded upon its interpretation of the exclusiveness
of administrative jurisdiction. In Arrow Transportation,the ICC suspended a schedule of reduced rates proposed by the respondent rail
carriers for a maximum statutory period of seven months pending a
9. 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1947) provides: "The term 'commerce' means
trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States
and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, of any Territory, or between points in the
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of
Columbia or any foreign country."
10. 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1947) provides: "The term 'affecting commerce'
means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
11. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1947) provides: "Whenever a petition shall
have been filed.. . the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists
" Section 10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
shall provide for an appropriate hearing ..
§ 1160(a) (1947) also empowers the Board to "prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce."
12. Wildenhus' Case, (Mall v. Keeper of Common Jail) 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
13. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
14. 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
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determination of whether the reduction was lawful and where the
statute, 49 U.S.C. §15(7) provided that "the proposed change of
rate... shall go into effect" if the Commission's proceeding had not
been concluded and an order made within the period of suspension.
The petitioners brought action in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama to enjoin the respondent carriers from
making the change pending an ICC decision; the Court affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals that the Commission had the sole
and exclusive power to suspend the operation of new rates and that
Congress had withdrawn from the courts any pre-existing power to
grant injunctive relief against such rate operations. 1 5 Mr. Justice
Brennan delivering the Court's opinion (6-3) after examining the
legislative history of rate regulation, found that Congress intended
to vest this problem exclusively with the Commission. He distinguished Congressional foreclosure of judicial power to interfere with
the timing of the rate changes from the uniformity of rate levels
fostered by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The entry of the
judiciary into this domain in his opinion would result in judicial
intrusion in administrative action and would permit the disposition
of the problems before a single judge prior to the final determination
by the ICC itself upon the issue of the reasonableness of the rate, a
review normally entrusted to a three man court. The Court rejected
the contention that injunctive relief was authorized by the National
Transportation Policy, and by the savings clause of 49 U.S.C. §22 (1)
which provided for the availability of existing common law and statutory remedies, since there was no showing that Congressional silence
implied the revival of a judicial remedy which might defeat rather
than promote the objectives of the National Transportation Policy.
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Black, dissented upon three principal grounds. The dissent
found that, if permitted to go into effect, the rates would unconscionably destroy not only barge lines, but also water shippers and
river ports, and would constitute an irreparable loss and injury which
justifiably called for the exercise of the inherent equity corrective
power of courts. Secondly, the dissent found that Section 15 (7) did
not foreclose judicial equity power from preventing such irreparable
damages and from maintaining the status quo. The Commission's
power under that provision was an exercise of primary jurisdiction
with broad grants of discretion for a limited period while the Court's
power was operative only as an equitable power to prevent irreparable damage and to maintain the status quo to support and aid the
temporary suspensive power of the Commission rather than to usurp
15.

372 U.S. 658 (1963).
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it. The dissent's analysis of the legislative history led it to conclude
no Congressional intent to withdraw judicial power. The adoption of
the National Transportation Policy of fostering sound economic
conditions among the transportation carriers and of preserving a
national scheme was construed as appropriate authority for the exercise of inherent equity jurisdiction to supplement the exhausted
suspensive power of the Commission.
Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden 1 6 and Local 207 InternationalAssociation of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Union v. Perko17 both presented problems over aspects of labor relations. In the Borden Case,
the Court (6-2) reversed the affirmation of judgment for plaintiff
who sued under state law for union refusal to refer him to a prospective employer after he was admitted into a Texas local union on a
clearance card basis from a Louisiana local. In the Perko Case, the
plaintiff, a union member employed as foreman, sued in a state court
to recover damages sustained as a result of his suspension by the
union and his discharge from employment for his violation of union
rules on helping boilermen on the job. In both instances the Court
rejected the contention that the state courts possessed an independent jurisdiction to grant relief. Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the
Court's opinions, found that Borden came within provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act and that relinquishment of judicial control to the administrative body was essential.' 8
In the absence of an overriding interest, courts were required to defer
to the exclusive competence of the NLRB where the subject matter
fell within its jurisdiction under Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2).
The Court rejected the contention that the plaintiffs' rights were controlled by International Assoc. of Machinists v. Gonzales,' 9 which
was distinguished on the grounds that the NLRB was without competence to afford a remedy in internal union relations while in the
present case, employment relationships were subject to NLRB jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented on the
grounds that the Gonzales, Borden and Perko Cases were indistinguishable on their faces. Moreover, the dissent preferred the policy
of permitting the individual employee recourse to conventional judicial litigation in local courts since regional or national administra16.
17.

373 U.S. 690 (1963).
373 U.S. 701 (1963).

18.

49 Stat. 452, amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1947).

19.

356 U.S. 617 (1958).
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tive hearings were distant and expensive. Mr. Justice Goldberg did
not participate.
The irreparability of damages and the availability of immediate
judicial remedies were disposed of by per curiam opinion. In Ex
Parte George,20 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas which found that the National Maritime Union
representing unlicensed crew members aboard the vessels of the
American Oil Company, was picketing a subsidiary refinery having a
valid collective bargaining agreement with another union, and was
therefore engaged in the object of disregarding, breaching or violating the collective bargaining agreement in violation of ART. 5154 (d)
§4, VERNON'S TEx. REv. CIV.

STATS. ANN.

(1947) and where the NMU

was adjudged in contempt for its deliberate disregard of the judicial
injunction. The Court held the state court was without jurisdiction
to discipline the petitioner if the picketing was arguably protected by
the National Labor Relations Act and that in the absence of the
Board's clear determination to the contrary, a court had no jurisdiction to determine whether such conduct came within the state's jurisdiction. 2 1 Even assuming that such conduct was not within the prohibitions of Section 8(b) (1) (A) or Section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the
National Labor Relations Act, it was arguably protected by Section 7
of the statute.
In the second instance, an application for the extension of a temporary restraining order in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern
Railway Co., 2 2 Mr. Justice Black granted the request where the
Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the railroads from putting new reduced
rates into effect after they were filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission under Section 6(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. Section 6(1) and where the Commission was empowered under Section 15(7) to suspend the new rates for a maximum seven
month period pending its hearing after which the proposed rates
might go into effect, and the Commission failed to complete its hearings and enter a final order on the rates within that period. Mr.
Justice Black ruled that Section 15(7) should not be interpreted to
destroy the jurisdiction of federal courts over the Commission to
restrain unlawful conduct which inflicted irreparable damage.
A similar conclusion was reached in Smith v. Evening News Association,2 3 where the Court (8-1) reversed and held that a union em20.
21.
22.
23.

371 U.S. 72 (1962).
See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
83 S.Ct. 1, (1962).
371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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ployee could maintain a suit in the state court under Section 301 of
the Management Relations Act 2 4 charging the employer with breach
of contract on the grounds that it had prohibited the plaintiff from
working during a strike although it had permitted other non-union
workers to report for work and receive full wages, in violation of
the collective bargaining contract prohibiting discrimination against
any employee because of membership or activity in the union. Mr.
Justice White, delivering the Court's opinion (8-1), held the preemption ruling in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garson,2 5 did
not apply to give the NLRB exclusive jurisdition. Teamsters, C.W. &
H. v. Lucas Flour Co.,2 6 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,2 7 Atkinson v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 2 8 were supportive of the principle that the

judicial remedy survived the statute. The Court refused to follow
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.29 on the grounds that these subsequent cases had
eliminated Westinghouse as authoritative precedent, and that Section 301 did not bar an employee suit to vindicate his individual rights
under a collective bargaining contract. The Court found that since
individual claims were often interwoven with union interests and
raised serious questions of enforcing collective bargaining agreements, it would stultify congressional policy of having these contracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal substantive law
if petitioner's claim were excluded from the coverage of Section 301.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, found that the duplication of governmental supervision through judicial and administrative machinery
would create confusion, would conflict and burden proceedings since
there was a wide divergence of practice and procedural rights between suits in state courts and proceedings before the NLRB in such
matters as statutes of limitations and bars to administrative proceedings. He found no evidence of Congressional intention to permit concurrent jurisdiction in suits over collective bargaining agreement
violations which were also unfair labor practices.
24. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides: "Suits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the

amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947).
25. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
26. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
27. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
28. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
29. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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SUBSTANTIALITY OF EVIDENCE
In a variety of factual circumstance the Court applied the general
principle that administrative findings must be supported by substantial evidence. This standard has been applied in the factual determination of Communist Party membership status, seniority status of
striking employees, establishment of rate schedules, and carrier merger proceedings. It is interesting to note the failure of the Court to
clearly indicate the precise contents of the standard it applied.
The standard adopted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for determining meaningful membership in the Communist Party
30
was examined by the Court in Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy,
where the petitioner, a long time resident alien in the United States,
petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to reopen the administrative hearing which had resulted in a deportation order based upon his membership in the Communist Party
under Section 241 (a) (6) (C) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.31 On certiorari, Mr. Justice Goldberg, delivering the
Court's opinion (5-4), reversed the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that attendance at some fifteen meetings of the party and
payment of dues over a two year period was too insubstantial evidence to support an administrative deportation order under the doctrines of Rowoldt v. Perfeto,3 1A and Galvan v. Press,3 2 which required "meaningful association" with the party as a standard. Since
such activities might be carried on without the requisite awareness,
the Government was required to satisfy the burden of proof by evidence of activities sufficient to give substantial support to the alien's
awareness of the party's political aspects. In the Court's opinion, the
basic defect was the lack of substantial evidence as required by Uni33
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan
and Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented upon the grounds that under the
Universal Camera Corp. doctrine, even though the Court could have,
upon an independent examination of the record, reached another conclusion, it was bound to follow the administrative finding unless it
30. 374 U.S. 469 (1963).
31. 66 Stat. 163, § 241(a) (6) (c), 204-205, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952) which
provides: "(a) Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon the order of the
Attorney General, be deported who . . . (6) is or at any time has been after
entry, a member of any of the following classes of aliens: . . . (C) Aliens who
are members of or affiliated with (I) the Communist Party of the United States."
31A. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
32. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
33. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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was not supported by the evidence. The dissent's examination led
it to conclude the evidence was both ample and substantial.
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corporation3 4 the Court reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and found
the employer engaged in an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 158
(1947) 35 when it extended a twenty year seniority credit to striking replacements and strikers who left the strike and returned to
work. Mr. Justice White, delivering the Court's opinion, found that
while evidence of the employer's intent was relevant in determining
an unfair practice, it was not an indispensable element of proof of
violation, 3 6 since it was permissible for the Board to draw upon its
experience in factual inquiries. 37 The Court upheld the Board's determination that an employer's claim of a legitimate purpose of extending such a credit in order to continue operations, a legitimate
business purpose, was totally impeached and dispelled by a finding
that such conduct encroached upon protected rights. NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 38 was distinguished from the present case on the
factual grounds that there the replacements actually replaced the
strikers while in the Erie case the replacements all obtained superior
seniority to those remaining on strike and not replaced. The Court
upheld the Board's decision in balancing the employer's legitimate
business interests to continue operations during the strike against
the national labor policy of protecting workers' interests, to find
that an employer's unfair labor practice was amply supported by the
evidence. In a short concurring note, Mr. Justice Harlan, while concurring, expressed doubts that the decision would be applicable to a
much shorter period of extra seniority.
A lack of substantial evidence was found in Interstate Commerce
39
Commission v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.
and three companion cases, where the Court reviewed an ICC order
which rejected proposed railroad rate decreases in railroad piggy373 U.S. 221 (1963).
35. Section 8(a) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization; . . . (5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of Section 9(a)."
34.

37.
38.

Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
304 U.S. 333 (1938).

39.

372 U.S. 744 (1963).

36.
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back or trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) service upon the grounds that the
proposed decreases would, without determining where the inherent
rate advantages might lie, result in a threat to the continued operations and existence of the coast-wise water-carrier industry, motorwater-motor carrier, door to door service and would conflict with the
objectives of the National Transportation Policy establishment of
rate differentials between rail rates and coast-wise shipping rates
(313 ICC 23). On review, the Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the District Court that the needs of national defense were
not an operative part of the National Transportation Policy but
agreed with the District Court reversal of the ICC order on TOFC
rate decreases. Mr. Justice Harlan for a unanimous Court, construed
Section 15a (3) of the Transportation Act of 1958, 4 0 in light of its
legislative history, to permit the railroads to respond to competition
by asserting their inherent advantages of cost and service. It rejected the Commission's interpretation that each form of transportation must remain viable at all costs and receive a significant share of
traffic. The Court held that Congress did not, in enacting Section
15a (3), regard the setting of a rate as a particular level to constitute
an unfair or destructive practice simply because it would divert some
or all of a competing mode of traffic, but was determined to prevent
the setting of rates which would impair or destroy the inherent advantages of a competing carrier. The Commission's finding that the
water carrier's out-of-pocket costs and distributed costs were below
those of the railroads, together with its failure to determine the problem of inherent advantage, resulted in the disallowance of rates since
41
they were not adequately supported by evidence in the record.
Although the Court supported the Commission's reliance upon the
"nation defense" factor and "commerce" in reaching its conclusion, it
reversed the District Court judgment that these factors were hopedfor goals rather than operative factors, and simultaneously reversed
the ICC reliance upon these factors as not supported by adequate
findings or by substantial evidence. Although it construed Section
15a (3) as protecting the inherent advantage of a carrier from
destructive competition, yet it found that other considerations, such
40. Section 15a(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C.
Section 15a(3) (1958) provides: "In a proceeding involving competition between
carriers of different modes of transportation subject to this Act, the Commission,
in determining whether a rate is lower than a reasonable minimum rate, shall
consider the facts and circumstances attending the movement of the traffic by the
carrier or carriers to which the rate is applicable. Rates of a carrier shall not
be held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of
transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation policy declared in this Act."
41. SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
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as national defense and commerce, were valid factors in rate setting.4 1A The Court based its reversal as well upon the Commission's
failure to find that the rate reduction was the initial step in the
threatening of the water-carrier's existence and upon its failure to
make supporting findings. 42 The proceeding was remanded to the
Commission for full hearing and determination.
In Burlington Truck Lines v. U. S. and General Drivers & Helpers
Union, Local 554 v. U. S.,43 where the ICC had granted an application for common carrier authority to transport commodities from
designated points in Nebraska to other states after other carriers refused to handle its cargo upon the union institution of a secondary
boycott growing out of its efforts to unionize the applicant's operations, and where Congress passed Section 8 (e) of the Labor-Management Relations Act 4 3A after four months following the issuance of
the order, the Court (8-1) reversed the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois which
affirmed the order and remanded the case to the Commission. Mr.
Justice White, expressing the viewpoint of seven Justices, held the
order to be an improvident exercise of the Commission's discretion
since there were no findings and analysis to justify the decision to
issue an application for authority to transport rather than to issue a
cease and desist order. The Commission was required to exercise its
discretion under Section 207 (a) within the standards of public convenience and necessity, and to have its findings supported by substantial evidence. 4 4 The Commission erred in refusing to utilize a
complaint procedure to dispose of the refusals to serve since there
was no substantial evidence in the record to conclude this procedure
would have been ineffective. The amendment to the Labor Management Relations Act, Section 8(e) should have become the basis of
the equity court's refusal to affirm the order and for its remanding of
the case to the Commission.
41A. U.S. v. Capitol Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357 (1945).
42. See Burlington Truck Lines Inc. v. U.S. 371 U.S. 156 (1962); Gilbertyifle Trucking Co. v. U.S. 371 US 115 (1962).
43. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
43A. Under Section 8(e) Congress declared it to "be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or
agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or
agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise
dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business
with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore
or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable
and void....

"

44. ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961); U.S. v. Carolina Carriers
Corp, 315 U.S. 475 (1942); U.S. v. Chi., M. Kg.P. & R. Co., 294 U.S. 499 (1935).
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Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan, concurred that the ICC intervened in
an underlying labor dispute to a degree unduly trenching upon the
NLRB's jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Clark, concurring separately, believed Congressional enactment of Section 8 (e) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 158(e) (1959) should have
resulted in the District Court vacating the order and the remanding
proceedings to the Commission.
Mr. Justice Black, while concurring in the Court's judgment setting aside the Commission's order granting a permanent certificate
to a new carrier, dissented upon the grounds there was no reason to
remand the case. He viewed the ICC's conduct as an impermissible
encroachment upon the NLRB jurisdiction, not justifying a remanding.
The Court unanimously affirmed and reversed in part a judgment
of the three-man United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts setting aside an ICC order which disapproved a proposed merger of motor carriers and requiring the owner of all corporate stock in one carrier to divest himself of such stock in Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. U. S. 4 5 Chief Justice Warren, for the Court, held
the evidence in the record before the administrative body adequately
supported the Commission's finding of a violation of Section 5 (4) of
the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, 54 Stat. 907, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(4), (1940) although Section 5(2) permitted the Commission to
authorize and approve the joint operation of properties belonging to
two or more common carriers or the mergers of them. 4 6 The Court
rejected the contention that the statutory provisions applied only to
corporate devices and did not include informal relationships and held
that the provisions encompassed every type of control since the Commission was empowered to adapt the provisions of Section 5 (4J to the
actualities and current industrial practices without having to return to Congress for additional authority each time industry practices
changed. The Court expressly supported the administrative finding
that permitting mergers where prior violations against mergers had
45. 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
46. Section 5(4) of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act as amended
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, except as provided in paragraph
(2), to enter into any transaction within the scope of subparagraph (a) thereof,
or to accomplish or effectuate, or to participate in accomplishing or effectuating,
the control or management in a common interest of any two or more carriers,
however such result is attained whether directly or indirectly, by use of common
directors, offcers, or stockholders, a holding or investment company or companies, a voting trust or trusts, or in any other manner whatsoever.... As used
in this paragraph ...
the words 'control or management' shall be construed to
include the power to exercise control or management."
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existed would hinder or defeat the administration of the statute. The
Court reversed the District Court order on divestiture of stock on the
grounds there was no record that the parties involved were heard on
this issue or that the proper standards were applied.
The Court, on certiorari, unanimously reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which reversed an interim
rate reduction order and a refund of the amounts collected in excess
of a 61/8 per cent return where a portion of an increased previously
filed rate was found unjustified and the remainder of the proceeding
was deferred in Federal Power Commission v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.4 7 Mr. Justice Clark held that the Commission's action
in severing the issue of the rate of return and deferring its consideration and hearing of the issue on the cost of service in a six-zonal
scheme of service utilized by the utility, was a valid exercise of its
discretion under Section 16 of the Natural Gas Act, 4 S Section 4(e),
to order a five month suspension period on the proposed increase with
a refund not ultimately justified by the utility company in proceedings. The FPC policy requiring a refund of rate excess in one zone
of service while not permitting an increase in excessively low rates
in another zone was found consistent with the statutory policy of not
permitting the utility to justify its illegal gains by its legitimate losses
elsewhere. Although the Court recognized that the old rate structure
as discriminatory was left by the order, the Court was certain of the
Commission's finding of a lawful 61/ per cent return and of the requirement of refund of excess. The Commission did not exceed its
statutory authority in ordering the interim order and refund since
the statutory purpose afforded complete, permanent and effective protection from excessive rates and charges. The FPC was found to exercise its discretion reasonably by examining the background of the
structure of rates in ordering a severance of issues and entering interim orders.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
In addition to classical opinions in the Best Case, the Court applied
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to interstate rate problems arising out of interstate routing practices in transportation, to railway
arbitration procedures, and to an expanded jurisdiction of the Civil
Aeronautics Board which materially affected the scope of the Sherman Act.
47.

391 U.S. 145 (1962).

48. 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1938) provides: 'T7he Commission shall have power to
perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such
orders, rules and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this chapter. Among other things, such rules and regulations may define accotintn, technical and trade tern used in this chapter;"
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In Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co. and DeRosier,4 9 where the
United States, suing in the District Court to condemn property for
the construction of a dam and reservoir in order to obtain possession
and title, asked authority to have the validity of mining claims reserved for administrative determination before the Bureau of Land
Management in the Department of the Interior. Later the United
States sought an administrative determination of the validity of the
respondents' mining claims alleging the claim insufficient to constitute a discovery, and respondents sued in the District Court to enjoin
the officials in the Department of the Interior from proceeding with
the administrative determination, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals decision, Mr. Justice Douglas delivering a ananimous opinion that conditions were suitable for the Court to wait until
the administrative agency with its special competence had ruled on
the issues. 5 0 Due Process did not forbid an administrative determination. 5 1 The institution of a judicial suit for title and possession was
not inconsistent with the administrative determination of a mining
claim on the property involved.
In Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways Inc., 5 2 in a suit to
recover the difference in rate charges resulting from the carrier's
practice of carrying unrouted intrastate routes, on certiorari the
Court (6-3) reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and held the shipper had a common-law right of action to whom the carrier owed a duty to ship over the cheapest available route where no adequate justification was presented for not
doing. Although Mr. Justice Clark, in delivering the Court's opinion,
admonished the lower federal courts to avail themselves of the aid
implicit in the administrative body's superiority in gathering the relevant facts and marshalling them into a meaningful pattern, he found
the plaintiff stated a justifiable cause of action, distinguishing the
facts from those in T.I.M.E. Inc. v. U. S. 5 3 since the issue involved
here dealt with the reasonableness of rates rather than of routes. The
absence of statutory procedure permitting the shipper to challenge
or to request routing practices in advance of shipment, the lack of
effect upon efficient administration of the regulatory statute, the
healthy effect of permitting suits of this type as a deterrent to future
misrouting practices, and the absence of any other judicial remedy
were policy justifications for permitting the cause of action. The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction did not compel the con49.

371 U.S. 334 (1963).

50.
51.

Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372 (1895).

52.

371 U.S. 142 (1962).

53.

359 U.S. 464 (1959).
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clusion that courts were powerless to award damages in every instance where the Commission could not award reparations. The survival of the judicial remedy was held not to depend upon the absence
or presence of primary administrative jurisdiction to decide basic
questions upon which relief depended, but rather upon the effect of
the exercise of the remedy on the regulation. Under Section 216(j)
of the Motor Carrier Act, such a remedy would not survive if it was
inconsistent with the statutory scheme of regulation.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
White, dissented upon the grounds that the T.I.M.E. decision controlled because it rested upon the principle that the courts might not
adjudicate a matter in which the Commission had been given primary
jurisdiction and because Congress had denied the Commission the
authority to award reparations for past unreasonable charges. Permitting the judicial remedy for recovery of past rate charges would
permit the indirect accomplishment of what Congress had not chosen
to do directly. The dissent was careful to observe that though the
statute did not contain protective provisions as it did in rate-making
cases, misrouting could not be done with impunity since Section 212
(a) permitted the Commission to suspend or revoke certificates, permits or licenses for wilful failure to comply with statutory provisions
while Section 216 (e) permitted a Commission order for the termination of unjust practices. 5 4 The dissent viewed the Majority premise
that the Commission's passing upon the reasonableness of the routing
practice would jeopardize the judicial remedy as untenable.
In Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 5 5 the Court (6-3) affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which upheld the decision
of the District Court awarding an injunction against a union striking
to secure its interpretation that a National Railroad Adjustment
Board order sustaining an employee's claim for reinstatement with
pay for time lost as a result of the discharge did not include an offset
for other income earned during the period of discharge after the
Board refused to clarify its order. Mr. Justice Stewart, delivering
the Court's opinion, held that Section 3 First (i) of the Railway
54. Section 216(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316b (1935)
§ 316(b) provides: "It shall be the duty of every common carrier of property by
motor vehicle ...

to ...

observe ...

reasonable . . . practices . . . relating to or

connected with the transportation of property in interstate . . . commerce." Section 216(e) provides: Whenever "the Commission shall be of the opinion that
any... practice... is or will be unjust and unreasonable . . . it shall determine
... the lawful... practice."
55. 373 U.S. 33 (1963).
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Labor Act, 5 6 being a mandatory, exclusive and comprehensive system
for resolving grievances, 57 and controversy concerning "money
awards", Section 3 First (p) authorized an employee to sue in a
Federal District Court to enforce the award in which the award by
the Board was prima facie evidence. Its total effect was to provide a
special form of judicial review for money awards. Allowing one of
the parties to obtain economic self-help by striking would violate the
statutory command and would disrupt the statutory grievance procedure.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented upon
the grounds that the Chicago River Case was inapplicable since it did
not deal with a nonfinal and nonbinding award. In light of the Majority's conclusion, the dissent stated the union had no further relief
since the carrier would not seek judicial review against its own
interests.
The Majority was viewed as placing the union in the position of
being without remedy or relief if the losing carrier refused to comply
and converted orders which Congress ordered to be nonfinal and nonbinding into final and binding if the claimant lost, but final and binding if the employer lost. The dissent did not find such Congressional
intention in the uneven result achieved by the Majority's construction. It found no such implied exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
intended by Congress and that the ruling created an unfair imbalance
in favor of the carrier-employer against the union and the employee.
In a civil suit against Pan American, W. R. Grace & Co. and Panagra charging violations of Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, 2, and 3, in Pan American World Airways Inc. v. U. S.,58
the defendants executed agreements in restraint of trade, the District
Court found no violation by Pan American and Grace although it held
Pan American violated Section 2 by suppressing Panagra's efforts to
extend its route and indicated Pan American should divest itself of
Panagra stock. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the
56. Section 3 (i) provides: "The disputes between an employee or group
of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934
shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating
officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an
adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the
parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board
with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the
disputes."
57. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & R. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30
(1957); Pennsylvania R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959).
58.

371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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District Court judgment. Mr. Justice Douglas delivering the Court's
opinion (5-2), found that the Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 737, 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1958), empowered the Civil Aeronautics Board
to have jurisdiction over unfair practices and unfair methods of competition even though originating prior to the passage of the act. 5 9
The Court found that the Board possessed broad jurisdiction including
power to deal with some anti-trust problems, although it refused to
categorically state there were no anti-trust violations left for the Department of Justice to enforce. The acts charged in the civil suit
dealing with limitations of route and territories were deemed within
the Board's jurisdiction. The present circumstances were distinguished
from Georgia v. PennsylvaniaR. Co., 60 and Maryland & Virginia Milk
ProducersAsso. v. U.S.61 Relying upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the phrases "unfair practices" and "unfair methods
of competition" in the Federal Aviation Act were construed to empower the Commission to supplement the Sherman Act by halting
proscribed methods of competition. The Court construed Section 2 of
the Civil Aeronautics Act as amending the Sherman Act insofar as
the Board's order might immunize a carrier from anti-trust violations
wherever it approved the carrier's action. 6 2 Because of the dangers
of judicial intrusion through the construction of the anti-trust laws
59. Section 411 provides: "The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon
complaint by any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers
that such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been
or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition
in air transportation or the sale thereof. If the Board shall find, after notice and
hearing, that such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in
such unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it shall
order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to cease and desist from
such practices or methods of competition."
60.

324 U.S. 439 (1945).

61.

362 U.S. 458 (1960).

62. Section 2 provides: 'In the exercise and performance of its powers and
duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the following among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
(a)
The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b)
The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in,
and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve
the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c)
The promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable rates, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences
or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
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which would result in the collision of judicial and administrative
action, and because many of the problems involved military and foreign policy considerations falling within the purview of presidential
rather than judicial power, the Court found that under Section 411,
the Board had authority to decide all questions of injunctive relief
against the division of territories and allocations of routes between
common carriers and air carriers. Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice
Harlan took no part in the case.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented upon
the grounds that the Majority decision was an extraordinary and unwarranted departure from established principles by which the antitrust and regulatory areas were accommodated to each other. He
charged the Majority with a pro tanto repeal of the anti-trust laws.
He found in the savings clause of the Aeronautics Act, an intention to
continue the Sherman Act in full force 6 3 while observing that the
absence of any provision for damages or reparations in the Aeronautics Act resulted in a survival of this remedy in the Sherman
Act. Moreover, he found no legislative history to support the
Majority's construction. Prior decisions in U.S. v. Borden Co.,6 4
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,65 and numerous supporting decisions

rejected the claims of pro tanto repeal of the anti-trust legislation.
In addition he found no practical basis for the Majority's decision to
withdraw questions of route allocation, territorial division and combinations between common carriers and air carriers from judicial
cognizance, but yet leave unaffected questions of rate-fixing, combinations between air carriers, or for giving the Board exclusive
jurisdiction where one party was outside the Board's jurisdiction
while it was not possessing such jurisdiction when both were within
its control.
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
In a single opinion on the requirements of a fair hearing in Williams
v. Zuckert, 6 6 where the petitioner, discharged from a civilian position with the United States Air Force for alleged misconduct, did
(d)
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development
of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign
and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense; . . . "
63. 94 U.S.C. §1506 (1958) provides: "Nothing contained in this chapter
shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or
by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies."
64.

308 U.S. 188 (1939).

65.

324 U.S. 439 (1945).

66. 371 U.S. 531 (1963).
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not, prior to his hearing, have his counsel request the appearance of
witnesses who signed affidavits against the petitioner or their crossexamination as required by applicable regulations, 6 7 and at the
hearing, moved this request, the Court on certiorari (7-2) by per
curiam opinion found the petitioner did not exercise his request in a
timely manner and was accorded ample opportunity to present his
own case and to rebut the charges against him. Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined by Mr. Justice Black, dissented upon the grounds that since
dismissal was not only a denial of the opportunity to work, but was
also a stigma upon character, the due process requirements of the
Fifth Amendment should protect him as in a criminal trial. The
dissent was opposed to the requirement that administrative proceedings be governed by strict formalities concerning the manner in
which exceptions or objections were made.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
The Court construed the scope of administrative conclusions of fact
in the Bianchi Case, while reviewing the legal determinations made
by various administrative agencies in taxation, rate-setting, labor relations and management of federally owned lands.
68
The Court determined it was restricted under the Wunderlich Act
to a review of the record on issues of fact submitted for administrative determination and was not free to receive evidence on such
issues in U.S. v. Bianchi c Co. 6 9 Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the
Court's opinion (7-2), reversed the judgment for the contractor
rendered by the Court of Claims in a suit against the Government
arising out of a breach of contract action where the contractor was
required to perform additional services under the contract in an
67. 5 CFR § 22.607 provides: "The Commission is not authorized to
subpoena witnesses. The employee and his designated representative, and the
employing agency, must make their own arrangments for the appearance of
witnesses."
68. 68 Stat. 81, 41 U.S.C. §321 (1954) provides: "No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness
of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized
representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any such decision to cases where fraud by such official
or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such
decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious
or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply had faith, or is not
supported by substantial evidence."
Section 322 provides: "No Government contract shall contain a provision
making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official,
representative, or board."
69.

373 U.S. 709 (1963).
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adversary administrative hearing in which each side offered evidence
and had an opportunity for cross-examination. The Court held that
the function of the Court of Claims in matters governed by "disputes"
clauses in government contracts afforded an extremely limited review
of administrative decisions and that both legislative history and prior
judicial decisions led to the conclusion that judicial review rested
solely on considerations of the administrative record. 7 0 The requirement of substantial evidence to support the administrative decision
premised upon the principle that all the evidence upon which the
agency predicated its decision must be presented. The Court refused
to consider the alleged irregularities in the administrative proceedings.
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented upon
the grounds that the administrative decision was capricious or
arbitrary because the evidence considered in making the decision was
not available to the claimant who did not possess the opportunity to
refute it. This failure was material to the issue of whether sub-surface excavation operations were within the orbit of the contractor's
responsibilities. He dissented from the Majority decision to remand
the proceedings to the administrative agency on the grounds they
were not required to offer the protection of Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1946), which required that all parties have the right to present their case or to defend by oral or documentary evidence, and to conduct such crossexamination as required for a full and true disclosure of the facts
involved.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Sun Oil Company,7 1 the Court
reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, and upheld the FTC determination of law that
the Sun Oil Company had violated Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1528, 15 U.S.C.
§13 (a) (1936) 72 and was not entitled to assert the good faith protec70. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U.S., 280 U.S. 420 (1930), NBC v. U.S.,
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
71. 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
72. Section 2(a) amended provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
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tion afforded by Section 2 (b) 3 where the Sun Oil Company had extended a price cut to one of its independently owned retail station
dealers in order to permit him to meet the competition of a neighboring retail gasoline station. Mr. Justice Goldberg, delivering the Court's
opinion on behalf of seven Justices, sustained the Commission's interpretation that the Section 2 (b) defense was limited to those situations
in which the discriminatory price cut was made in response to a
lower price of the seller's own competitor and not to a competitor of
seller's customer. The Court stated that extending this protection to
the seller's customer would violate Congressional intent in the light
of the proviso's legislative history. In a separate memorandum, Mr.
Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, concurred in the
Court's conclusion but would have remanded the case to the Commission to afford an opportunity to Sun Oil to demonstrate that the
competitor of Sun's retail seller was in fact an integrated supplierretailer or that he had in fact received a price cut from his own
supplier.
The legal determinations of the Internal Revenue Service were
reviewed in Schlude v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,7 4 where
the taxpayers operating a dancing studio, maintained an accrual
accounting system for income received by creating a deferred income
account for the total contract price of each dance contract, and
reported the amounts representing the lessons actually taught and
the cancellations made as income upon an annual basis, and deducted
the royalties and sales commissions actually paid, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue increased the ordinary income for three
years to include the amounts either received or receiveable despite
the fact that the contracts obligated the taxpayer to render service
in years in advance of the tax year in which the obligation was
created. The Court (5-4) upheld the Commissioner's exercise of
discretion in this determination as reasonable. Mr. Justice White,
delivering the Court's opinion, sustained the exercise of discretion
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit or such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them. .."
73. Section 2(b) provides: "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a
complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or
services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case
made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of
this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission
is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however,
that nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller from rebutting the prima
facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith, to
meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished
by a competitor."
74. 372 U. S. 128 (1963).
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under Section 41, 1939 Code, 7 5 and Section 446 (b) of the 1954 Code, 7 6
stating that the studio's accounting system did not clearly reflect
income under the doctrine in American Auto.. Assoc. 7 7 The Majority
interpreted the repeal of Section 452 of the 1954 Code which permitted the practice upon which the taxpayer relied as reinstating
longstanding administrative and lower court rulings that accounting
systems deferring prepaid income could be rejected by the Commissioner. The taxpayer's accounting system was deemed artificial in
that it treated advance payments for future indefinite service as
based not upon the taxpayer's income, but upon the customer's
future decisions. Moreover, the percentage royalties and commissions for lessons sold regardless of type of payment, were paid and
deducted in the year paid regardless of deferment of income to a
later period.
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice Goldberg, dissented, viewing the repeal of
Section 452 of the 1954 Code as not constituting a disapproval of
the accrual accounting principle as shown by the testimony of the
Secretary of the Treasury and the legislative history but rather as
based upon a fear of double deductions resulting from the shift
from the non-accrual system to an accrual system of accounting during the transition year. The Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner 78 was distinguished on the grounds that no proof of ratable
dues was offered while in the American Auto. Assoc. Case,7 9 where

the Club offered to provide statistical evidence that proration of dues
75. Section 41 provides: "The net income shall be computed upon the
basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year,
as the case may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of
accounting has been employed, or if the method employed does not clearly
reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such
method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income.
If the taxpayer's annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as
defined in Section 48 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or does
not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar
year."
76. Section 446 provides: "(a) General Rule:Taxable income shall be
computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer
regularly computes his income in keeping his books. (b) Exceptions.- If no
method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method
used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be
made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does
clearly reflect income."
77.

367 U.S. 687 (1961).

78.

353 U.S. 180 (1957).

79.

Supra., note 77.
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matched the proportion of yearly costs incurred each month in rendering services attributable to those dues, the Court rejected the offer
upon the grounds that both the amount and timing of services rendered were within the control of the individual members rather than
that of the Association. Nevertheless the dissent observed that estimated cancellations of contracts reported in the year would have to
be based upon the very type of statistical evidence required in the
American Auto. Assoc. Case.
The Court was badly divided in its review of administrative rate
determinations in Wisconsin v. Federal Power Commission and two
companion cases, California v. Federal Power Commission and Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Federal Power Commission8 ° where the
Supreme Court (5-4) affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit which upheld FPC refusal to
reject specific rate increases filed by Phillips Petroleum under
Section 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act after its investigations under
Section 5 (a) 8 i of the Act during the course of which it consolidated
twelve proceedings under Section 4(e). 82 Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the Court's opinion, upheld the Commission's abandonment of the
80. 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
81. Section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. 717d(a)
(1938) provides: "Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own
motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas
distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded,
observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with
any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such
rate, charge, or classification Is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or
preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge,
classification, rule, regulation, practice or contract to be thereafter observed
and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, that the Commission shall have no power to order any increases in any rate contained in the
currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such
natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing
rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are
not the lowest reasonable rates."
82. Section 4(e) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 823, as amended 76
Stat. 72, 15 U.S.C. (Supp IV) Section 717c(e) (1962) provides in part: "Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority.., to
enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness . . . and, pending such hearing
and decision .. . may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use
... but not for a longer period than five months.... If the proceeding has not
been concluded and an order made at the expiration of the suspension period, on
motion of the natural-gas company... the proposed change or rate ... shall go
into effect. Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the
Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond,
to be approved by the Commission, to refund any amounts ordered by the
"
Commission ..
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individual company cost-of-service method of determining rates and
supported its adoption of the area rate approach in which fair prices
would be determined by the reasonable financial requirements of the
industry for each of the various producing areas of the country. The
Commission's decision terminating its Section 4(e) hearings and
docket was, in the Court's opinion, based upon merit since the 1954
standards adopted by the Commission in determining present rate
fairness were not either outmoded, stale or unfair, although the same
rates were outmoded and unfair as applied to the past rates. In both
instances the Court found the Commission decision was based upon
substantial evidence that the rate increases did not bring the
revenues up to the cost of service. The Court observed that no
single method must be followed by the Commission in considering
the justness and reasonableness of rates.8 3 Terminating of proceedings was not an abuse of discretion where the only alternative was a
remanding for additional evidence which would delay the Commission and the solution of the problem for many years.
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice Brennan, in a bitter tone, dissented pointing to the
increased cost of natural gas amounting to billions of irretrievable
dollars to the consumer. Allowable deductions, exploration and
development costs, depletion allowance, interest costs, cost allocations between oil and gas, purchased gas costs, and interests which
it determined should have, in the opinion of the dissent, been disallowed in computing 1954 costs. The dumping of the 1954 schedule
in determining past rates and their retention in present rate determination was viewed as inconsistent and the Majority contention of
the dislocation attendant upon further delay was challenged upon the
grounds that such delay occurred under the procedure approved by
the Court and could have been avoided by requiring prompt cooperation by Phillips in providing data to the Commission. The dissent
viewed the Majority intimation of the validity of the area rate
approach as premature since it contained serious doubts as to its
constitutional validity and they charged the Commission with failure
to observe the Congressional mandate in setting just and reasonable
rates by embarking upon a highly questionable rate procedure.
The Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and on certiorari in NLRB v. General
Motors Corp.8 4 held that the Board correctly determined that under
the Indiana Right-to-Work Law, Section 8(a) (5) of the National
83. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942); FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FTC, 324
581 U.S. (1945).
84. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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Labor Relations Act S 5 did not prohibit adoption of "agency shops"
and that an employer's refusal to bargain collectively over that proposal constituted an unfair labor practice. Mr. Justice White, for a
unanimous Court, rejected the contention that such bargaining was a
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, and instead found legislative historical evidence to support Congressional intention to prohibit
compulsory union affiliation while desiring to have employees who
benefited from the successful negotiation of the union help to defray
8
the costs of such activities. 6
In a companion case, Retail Clerks InternationalAssociation, Local
1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn,8 7 the Court unanimously decided
that an agency shop agreement in which non-union member employees
paid fees to the union which were equivalent to union member initiation fees and dues was affected by Section 14(b) of the National
Relations Act, Amended, 29 U.S.C. §164 (b) (1947) and although not
prohibited under the federal statute were subject to the Florida
Right-to-Work statute, but might be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB and beyond the power of the state court to prohibit.
The Court retained the case on its calendar and requested full argument and the viewpoints of the NLRB as well as the Solicitor-General
of the United States. Mr. Justice Goldberg did not participate in
either case.
In Boesche v. Udall,8 8 the Court unanimously upheld the authority
of the Secretary of Interior to administratively cancel a noncompetitive oil and gas lease on public land under the Mineral
Leasing Act where the lease was issued in violation of a departmental
regulation. Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §226
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant to the first qualified
applicant, without competitive bidding, the oil and gas leases of
land in the public domain not within a known geological structure.
Departmental administrative regulation provided that no offer for a
85. Section 8(a) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
86. Section 8(a) (3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer. .(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition or employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization: Provided, that nothing in this Act, or in any other
statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization. . .to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the
later ..
" See also, S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
87.

373 U.S. 746 (1963).

88.

373 U. S. 472 (1963).
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noncompetitive lease might be made for less than 640 acres except
where the land was surrounded by lands not available for leasing
under the act. 8 9 The Court, Mr. Justice Harlan delivering its opinion,
rejected the petitioner's claim that Section 31 of the Mineral Leasing
Act, 30 U.S.C. §188 (1920) required judicial action to cancel the
lease. 9 0 The Court found that the Mineral Leasing Act did not withdraw the Secretary's general powers of management over the public
lands and his authority to cancel the lease administratively because
of its invalidity from the inception. 9 1 The issuance of land patents
which divest the government of title and control was distinguished
from the issuance of a leasehold which did not give the lease full
ownership of a fee or an unencumbered estate in minerals with the
Secretary possessing a subsisting power to correct his own errors of
issuance. Section 31 of the Mineral Leasing Act was construed to
apply to post-issuance events and the Court's examination of the
legislative history of the statute, although not conclusive, mitigated
against the withdrawal of the Secretary's general power of administrative cancellation of leases.
THE JUSTICES AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR
The bulk of the responsibility for writing the significant administrative law decisions of the last term fell upon the shoulders of three
members of the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice White and Mr.
Justice Clark, with the former two each authoring slightly less than
92
a quarter of the opinions.
The voting behaviour of the Justices deviated from the pattern
which students of public law find in the constitutional law opinions
of the Warren Court. While a high cohesion exists among the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan,
joined often by Mr. Justice Goldberg on constitutional law issues, the
degree of cohesion among the entire Court membership is higher in
the administrative law opinions of the Court. Percentages of agreement with the Majority opinion vary from a low of 61.5 per cent for
Mr. Justice Douglas to a high of 92.3 per cent for Mr. Justice White.
89. 43 C.F.R. §192.42(d) (1963).
90. Section 31 of the Mineral Leasing Act provides: "Except as otherwise
herein provided, any lease Issued under the provisions of. . .(this Act) may be
forfeited and canceled by an appropriate proceeding in the United States
District Court for the district in which the property, or some part thereof, is
located whatever the lessee fails to comply with any of the provisions of . . .
(the Act), of the lease, or of the general regulations promulgated under... (the
Act) and In force at the date of the lease . . ."
91. See Cameron v. U.S., 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
92. See Table 1, Infra., Authorship of Significant Administrative
Decisions of the Supreme Court, October 1962-January 1963 Term.
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A high degree of cohesion exists among Mr. Justice White, Mr.
Justice Goldberg, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Chief Justice Warren
while significantly lower percentages of agreement with the Majority
appear among the opinions of Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan,
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas. 9 3 Mr. Justice Black, Mr.
Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Chief Justice Warren
were in highly significant disagreement with the opinions of the
Court.
The Warren Court demonstrates bloc behaviour in dissenting voting. Mr. Justice Harlan found himself dissenting most often in the
company of Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White. On the
other hand, the Chief Justice was often found to dissent in agreement
with Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Brennan. The role of Mr.
Justice Clark is unique in that his dissenting position attracted the
supporters of both other blocs. While Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Douglas continued to display a high degree of cohesion in
dissenting, they were unable to carry with them the Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Goldberg in the expression of
their sharp differences. Mr. Justice Stewart, normally voting with
the conservative bloc of the Court on constitutional law issues found
himself equally in the company of the Justices of diverse views, Mr.
94
Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Douglas.
The behaviour of the Justices in majority and concurring voting
indicates that Mr. Justice White voted with the Majority Concurring opinions twenty-four out of twenty-six times and found himself
most often in the company of Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice
Stewart, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan and Chief Justice
Warren. Mr. Justice Goldberg and Mr. Justice Black cast the fewest
votes in support of either the majority of concurring views. Mr.
Justice Brennan showed a high degree of cohesion in supporting the
Chief Justice while Mr. Justice Harlan, rarely voting with Mr.
Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark, found himself very frequently
with Mr. Justice Brennan. The Chief Justice was rarely found supporting the views espoused by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Goldberg.

95

Most significant at this point in the history of the Court is the
emergence of Mr. Justice White in assuming a heavy workload of the
Court and assuming leadership of the majority or concurring views
in twenty-four out of twenty-six written opinions. Whether this
trend will continue in part will depend upon his future role upon the
Court.
93.
94.

See Table 2, Infra., "Percentage of Agreement and Dissent."
See Table 3, Infra., "Dissenting Behaviour Blocs."

95.

See Table 4, Infra., "Majority and Concurring Voting Blocs."
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TABLE 1
AUTHORSHIP OF SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OCTOBER 1962 Justice

Opinion
of the
Court

Warren, C. J. 1
11
Black
2
Douglas
Clark
5
Harlan
6
Brennan
2
Stewart
1
White
6
Goldberg
2
1.
2.
3.

JANUARY 1963 TERM

Percentage Concurof Written
rence
Opinions
of Court3

4.0
0.0
8.0
20.0
24.0
8.0
4.0
24.0
8.0

Partial Dissent
Concurrence

1

2
2
1

8.3
25.0
16.7
16.7
8.3
8.3
8.3
8.3

1
32
2

2

22

Percentage
of Authorship of
Dissents3

1

Opinion in Chambers
Including one dissent from a Per Curiam Opinion
Excluding one Opinion in Chambers and Per Curiam Opinion

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF AGREEMENT
AND DISSENT 1
Justice

Percent Agreement with
Majority

Warren, C. J.4
2

Black
Douglas
4
Clark
4
Harlan
Brennan
Stewart
White
5
Goldberg
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

80.0
69.2
61.5
76.0
76.0
84.5
80.8
92.3
89.4

Percent
Concurring

8.0
0.0
19.2
12.0
4.0
7.6
0.0
0.0
10.5

Excluding Per Curiam Opinions
Excluding One Opinion in Chambers
Per Curiam Dissents excluded
Not participating one decision
Not participating five decisions

Percent
Concurring
in Part

0.0
7.6
0.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
3.8
0.0
0.0

Percent8
Dissenting

12.0

23.1
19.2
12.2
16.0
7.6
15.4
7.6
10.5
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TABLE 3
DISSENTING BEHAVIOUR' BLOCS
ho
CS

.4)

Justice

Harlan
Stewart
White
Clark
Douglas
Goldberg
Black
Brennan
Warren, C.
1.

J.

4
3
2
1
1
1

3
4
2
1
2
1

2
2
2
1
-

1
1
2
4
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1
2

1
2
5
1
3
-

1
1
1
2
1
-

2
3
1
6
1
2

-

-

-

-

2
1
1
2
2

2
2
2
3

Excludes Partial and Per Curiam Dissents

TABLE 4
MAJORITY AND CONCURRING VOTING BLOCS

r

14

0

Justice

22
21
21
20

22
19
21
19

21
19
18
19

21
21
18
17

20
19
19
17
-

20
22
17
21
17

19
19
18
17
16

19
17
15
15
14

18
17
13
15
12

Warren, C.J. 20

22

17

21

17

-

17

15

16

Douglas
Goldberg

19
19

19
17

18
15

17
15

16
14

17
15

18

18
-

16
14

Black

18

17

13

15

12

16

16

14

-

White
Brennan
Stewart
Clark
Harlan

